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The Politics of Sensemaking and Sensegiving at Work 
Abstract 
Purpose – The aim of this paper is to investigate how political activities and processes 
influence sensemaking and sensegiving among top management, middle management and 
employees and to examine its consequences for implementing new knowledge. 
Methodology – Data were collected in a Norwegian bank using in-depth interviews with 
middle managers and financial advisers. Observations of meetings, informal conversations 
and verbatim notes were also used in data collection among top managers. A practice-based 
approach was used as an analytical lens. 
Findings – Top managers’ political activities of excluding others from the decision process 
affects their sensemaking and resulted in sensegiving contradictions between spoken intent 
and how to change practice. Middle managers’ political activities were to accept top 
managers’ sensegiving instead of managing themselves in their own sensemaking to help 
financial advisers with how to change their role and practice. As a result, middle managers’ 
sensemaking affects their engagement in sensegiving. For financial advisers, the political 
processes of top and middle managers resulted in resistance and not making sense of how to 
change and implement new knowledge. 
Originality – No studies to our knowledge identify the three-way conceptual relationship 
between political activities, sensemaking and sensegiving. In addition, we believe that the 
originality lies in investigating these relationships using a three-level hierarchy of top 
management, middle management and employees. 
Research limitations – A total of 30 in-depth interviews, observations of five meetings and 
informal conversations might call for further studies. In addition, a Norwegian study does not 
account for other countries’ cultural differences concerning leadership style, openness in 
decisions and employee autonomy. 
Keywords – political activities, sensemaking, sensegiving, middle managers, a practice-
based approach, new knowledge 
Paper type – Research paper 
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Introduction 
 
Investigating the political struggle for control and the active, resistive or reactive forces 
among colleagues and leaders might be crucial for our understanding of organisational 
practices and change (Fox, 2000; Schneider, 2007). However, in spite of encouragement to 
extend our knowledge of power and politics and of how they influence learning, change and 
innovation, this has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; 
Contu et al., 2003; Contu and Willmott, 2003; Lawrence et al., 2005; Antonacopoulou et al., 
2006; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Gherardi, 2009). Notable 
exceptions are Thomas and Davies (2005) and Sonenshein (2010), which address the 
dynamics of power and politics related to change, Maitlis and Lawrence (2007), Voronov 
(2008), Peirano-Vejo and Stablein (2009); Hope (2010), which explore politics related to 
sensemaking and sensegiving, and Vince (2001, 2004), Labatut et al. (2010); Mørk et al. 
(2010), which investigate power in resistance and negotiations as an inter-group phenomenon 
and how power and politics link to emotions. 
 
What is substantially covered in the literature is that change and innovation require learning, 
knowledge sharing, knowledge requests and the transfer of new knowledge across and within 
social practices at work (Swan et al., 2002; Newell et al., 2009). Consequently, it is argued 
that for change and innovation to succeed requires new knowledge to be negotiated within 
existing knowledge domains at work (Weick and Westley, 1996; Clegg et al., 2005). 
Accordingly, March (1991) argues that innovation requires a combination of the exploitation 
of existing knowledge and exploration of new knowledge within each knowledge domain. A 
knowledge domain typically has its own set of competence regimes that define what 
competent participation is through rules, resources, norms, perspectives, values and interests 
as a result of the shared negotiation of the competence (Newell et al., 2009). Hence, new 
knowledge might fail to be translated into a knowledge domain if it threatens existing 
boundaries, control over knowledge and power structures (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000; 
Maurice and Sorge, 2000; Swan et al. 2002; Robertson, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; 
Newell et al., 2009). 
 
Dougherty (2003) links new knowledge to sensemaking, arguing that new knowledge needs 
to make sense for those responsible for implementing the novelty to enable them to change 
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their practice accordingly. Sensemaking refers to employees’ construction and development 
of a framework that enables an understanding of experiences and of the organisation’s reality 
(Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 1995; Voronov, 2008). Sensemaking is therefore 
fuelled by the flux of practice actions and interactions within it, in employees’ processes of 
creating meaning from new events and new knowledge (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick 
et al., 2005; Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). In the sensemaking literature, the emphasis is on 
power as a dynamic, active force, manifested through its use in local practices, where power 
is acknowledged through its use as political acts (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; Foucault, 
1997; Fox, 2000; Clegg et al., 2006). In addition, when investigating strategies or tactics 
leaders use when they engage in sensegiving to shape the sensemaking of their employees, 
sensegiving is acknowledged as political processes (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). We need, 
however, more studies that explore and identify these political activities and how they affect 
sensegiving and sensemaking at different hierarchical levels, as research on sensegiving for 
the most part focuses on leaders at one level and their employees at another. Hence, our 
research question is ‘How does political activities and processes influence sensegiving and 
sensemaking in a three-level hierarchy at work’? 
 
We investigate the political activities of sensemaking and sensegiving among top managers, 
middle managers and financial advisers in a large Norwegian bank. In our study, the 
implementation of new knowledge is related to how financial advisers have to change both 
the nature of the products they work with and their established work practices. We therefore 
believe that the case might serve as an example of how changing (or not changing) existing 
knowledge domains for implementing (or not implementing) the new knowledge vision is 
influenced by political processes that influence sensemaking and sensegiving activities. We 
also explore whether a practice-based approach can be a fruitful avenue to address these 
concerns. Using a practice-based approach means highlighting the situated nature of learning, 
knowledge and innovation as integrated processes embedded in social practices, which unfold 
within a broader field of interconnected practices (Schatzki et al., 2001; Blackler, 2004; 
Gherardi, 2009). Hence, a practice-based approach highlights the importance of practitioners 
knowing how to perform within a particular knowledge domain, where sensemaking and 
sensegiving are integrated and embedded in processes of ‘knowing in practice’ (Nicolini et 
al., 2003; Weick et al., 2005). 
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First, we outline a theoretical framework on politics, sensemaking and sensegiving and a 
practice-based approach. Second, we investigate the politics of sensemaking and sensegiving 
activities in our study of top management, middle management and financial advisers in the 
bank. Third, our results are presented and discussed in relation to previous theories and 
research, where we outline propositions and contributions. We conclude with some practical 
implications and limitations. 
 
A practice-based approach to politics 
Practices are often contested by professionals to maintain control and authority over 
knowledge domains (Swan et al., 2002). Implementing new knowledge is therefore 
recognised as political processes (Fidler and Johnson, 1984; Klein and Sorra, 1996; Brown 
and Duguid, 1991,2001; Newell et al., 2009; Thomas and Hardy, 2011) because new 
knowledge requires a new balance between the exploitation of knowledge in the organisation 
and the exploration of new knowledge in order to change (March, 1991). New knowledge 
might fail to be implemented because it does not align well or it threatens existing 
boundaries, power positions and politics that empower some employees over others 
(Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000; Swan et al., 2002; Robertson, 2007; Newell et al., 2009). It is 
in practices that new knowledge is enacted or betrayed with the consequence of changing 
established practices or not (Nicolini et al., 2003). In line with a practice-based approach, 
power and politics will typically be embedded in established practices (Maurice and Sorge, 
2000; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Gherardi, 2011). Practitioners may accept or resist the 
novelty while actively co-creating themselves through episodes of enacted political agency 
and negotiations (Marshall and Rollinson, 2004; Antonacopoulou, 2008; Orlikowski and 
Scott, 2008; Gherardi, 2011). Thus, situated, ongoing knowing within practices unfolds 
through actions of agreement and resistance, persuasions and negotiations within daily 
activities in order to create meaning (Suchman, 2003; Blackler, 2004). We take a practice-
based approach, which implies that new knowledge may depend on the alignments of the 
presented novelty with the already existing practice-based knowing (Dougherty, 2003). 
Consequently, we approach politics as power in action as argued by Hardy (1996), where 
episodic power is discrete political activities initiated by self-interested actors and systemic 
power is diffused through routines and practices that constitute organisations (Foucault, 
1997; Lawrence et al., 2005). 
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Politics refers to both the social force that influences organisations as well as the strategic 
processes that employ or challenge power relations (Vince, 2004:66). Voronov (2008) 
distinguishes between surface politics as the exercise of power over various sources of 
influence (control over resources, authority, manipulation, gatekeeping) and deep structure 
politics, which is embedded in culture, symbols and communicative acts. Deep structure 
politics refers to the system, the structure, the sensemaking and the taken-for-granted rules 
(Frost and Egri, 1991; Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). For key managers, politics is about 
both their political will and their power to influence change processes (Macpherson and 
Jones, 2008). Politics is therefore the activities of both creating a perception of legitimacy 
and shaping a perception of organisational reality as well as imposing this perception of 
reality on others (Hardy, 1996), which demonstrates its close link to sensemaking and 
sensegiving (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007; Voronov, 2008). 
 
Sensemaking and sensegiving 
Sensemaking is the processes of the social construction of plausible meanings when 
discrepant cues interrupt daily practice, for instance new knowledge, where practitioners 
need to create new meaning on how to change their practices (Weick, 1988; Marshall and 
Rollinson, 2004; Weick et al., 2005; Corradi et al., 2010). Sensemaking is therefore 
acknowledged in ongoing activities at work as one of the main aspects of the notion of 
practice and practicing, where all activities among practitioners are ‘constituted and are 
subordinated to a joint system as joint sensemaking’ (Weick, 2009:57). Sensemaking is 
therefore about the processes of meaning construction and reconstruction as an attempt to 
develop a framework of own experiences related to own practices and the organisational 
reality (Weick et al., 2005; Voronov, 2008). Sensegiving refers to the processes of attempting 
to influence the sensemaking of others. It is an important activity for leaders as it shapes 
employees towards some intended definitions of organisational reality through the processes 
facilitated for acceptance, enthusiasm and energy for changing practice (Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). 
 
Sensemaking and sensegiving must be acknowledged as processes, where these processes 
and activities related to the implementation of, for instance, new knowledge are fuelled with 
enacted power and occur as a result of political activities (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; 
Foucault, 1997; Fox, 2000; Clegg et al., 2006; Mørk et al., 2010). Sensegiving is bound up 
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with power as it either normalises or shuts down alternative interpretations as a result of 
leaders’ decisions and their facilitation of activities related to how to implement new 
knowledge and also how leaders might limit who participates in sensemaking processes 
(Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Voronov, 2008). This is confirmed in the studies by Maitlis 
(2005) and Maitlis and Lawrence (2007), where leaders’ sensegiving processes are argued to 
be political activities as they influence the interpretations and sensemaking of others. Weick 
et al. (2005) recognise that powerful actors give unequal access to roles and positions, which 
again influences meaning constructions as people endeavour to make sense of equivocal 
inputs and enact this sense back to make the world more orderly (Mills, 2003; Weick et al., 
2005). In these sensegiving activities, politics refers to both the social force when enacting 
power and the politics of strategic processes and sensemaking activities (Hardy et al., 2003; 
Vince, 2004). 
 
Maitlis and Lawrence (2007) also find that leaders’ engagement in sensegiving is triggered 
by their own sensemaking, not just formal authority. Further, their engagement is motivated 
by issues that are perceived to be ambiguous and unpredictable in their own sensemaking, 
while their sensegiving is enabled by their issue-related experiences and by whether the 
organisation has already performed well in the relevant issue domain. 
 
We investigate the politics of sensegiving and sensemaking related to Maitlis and Lawrence’s 
(2007) triggers and enablers for sensegiving processes and to how sensegiving activities 
influence sensemaking processes. Our study includes top management, middle management 
and financial advisers, and we explore Balogun’s (2003) argument that middle managers can 
be characterised as change intermediaries and strategic assets if given sufficient support for 
their own interpretation and sensemaking potential as a strategic asset. We take a practice-
based approach, investigating the embeddedness of politics when new knowledge is 
negotiated, enacted or reproduced in practices at work. 
 
Research context and methodology 
The study was conducted in one of the largest financial institutions, a bank alliance (BA), in 
Norway. The BA is a network organisation with operations in five major regions in Norway, 
namely BA North, BA West, BA Central, BA South-East and BA East. The BA consists of 
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approximately 350 local banks and 5,500 employees, providing geographical coverage for 
most of Norway within these regions. The BA’s five regions are organised through the joint 
ownership and cooperation of the holding company, the BA Group, which consists of the 
BA’s top management. 
The BA group introduced the following new knowledge vision in 2007 (BA´Strategy 
Document 2007-2010). ’BA’s knowledge vision is to develop a learning organisation with 
employees that are knowledgeable and apply their knowledge professionally and in the best 
interests of BA’s customers’. The knowledge vision has two main goals: a) financial advisers 
are to serve all four business domains of i) loans, ii) savings and financial placements, iii) 
money transmissions and iv) insurance and b) financial advisers are supposed to change their 
roles towards proactive selling within these four business domains. Our study addressed the 
implementation of new knowledge, which includes substantial new knowledge on financial 
products and substantially changing their role behaviour as finance advisers.  Through 
methods of random sampling from the target population including every bank in the alliance, 
we selected a representative sample of local bank leaders and financial advisers employed at 
banks covering all regions in Norway. Additionally, the BA’s top management were part of 
our study. 
 
Data collection  
Case study methods allow researchers to understand complex phenomena in their natural 
environments and focus on the actual dynamics and meaningful characteristics of 
organisational events (Eisenhardt, 1991; Yin, 1994). With research questions such as why 
and how, case study approaches based on explorative qualitative design are most suitable 
(Yin, 1994). In addition, the case study methodology is frequently deployed for 
organisational learning and knowledge research (Voronov, 2008). Hence, we believe that a 
case study approach enabled us to use multiple sources of data in order to grasp the context of 
politics, sensemaking and sensegiving. Our study consisted of semi-structured interviews 
with middle managers and financial advisers as well as observations, participation in 
meetings, notes and informal conversations with top managers in 2008 and 2009. There were 
30 interviews (six middle managers and 24 financial advisers) and we attended five meetings. 
The interviews lasted, on average, one hour and were tape-recorded and transcribed. 
Feedback was obtained from respondents on the transcriptions, and follow-up telephone 
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conversations were held with 10 of the 30 respondents for clarification. Observations and 
verbatim notes for the top manager meetings, and informal conversations with them, resulted 
in substantial data. They had initiated our research and they were aware of how we would use 
the data. Moreover, all our respondents were anonymous. We focused on how they 
communicated, what was said and by whom, their social interactions, how they solved 
possible conflicts of interest, how different interpretations were possible, possible power 
structures and powerful actors, their perceptions, communication forms, engagement and 
sensemaking, and we witnessed how they engaged in sensegiving activities. With regard to 
interviewing middle managers, we focused on their roles as leaders, their perceptions and 
sensemaking of the change initiative, their sensegiving activities towards top management 
and those financial advisers they were responsible for, what their experiences were, how they 
interpreted financial advisers’ perceptions, sensemaking of the novelty, empowerment, 
political activities that they might identify and their interpretation of how to change practices 
in accordance to the new knowledge vision. The interviews with financial advisers were 
somewhat similar to those with middle managers. However, the focus was more related to 
their practices, to how they had changed (or not) their practices and to their interpretations of 
the new knowledge vision, their experiences with sensegiving activities, their sensemaking 
activities, their relationships with colleagues and their viewpoints on top management, 
middle management and their own leader. We also asked about their sensemaking in relation 
to challenges and opportunities and about how they rose to these. We asked what form their 
involvement had taken, why they had participated in the way they had, who else was 
involved, the point of conflict and cooperation, when and with whom they talked and what 
action was taken to understand, manage and resolve new knowledge. 
  
Data analysis 
The data analysis was carried out in multiple stages. First, we provided detailed and 
descriptive write-ups of verbatim notes from the observations, informal meetings and 
documents. Second, all interviews were fully transcribed and organised for each local bank, 
consisting of their leader and financial adviser. Then, all data were coded in NVivo. Open 
and axial forms of coding were used to identify categories (Strauss and Corbin, 2008). We 
conducted a thorough analysis of all data in order to identify categories that occurred 
regularly in the majority of sensemaking and sensegiving accounts. Each category detected in 
the data may be viewed as a discursive, temporarily ‘condensed theme’ or a ‘question of 
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concern’ (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007:61) for respondents’ sensemaking and sensegiving 
related to possible political activities and processes. An explorative, qualitative, in-depth 
approach enabled us to investigate politics in connection with sensemaking and sensegiving 
activities among top management, middle managers and financial advisers. The data were 
analysed iteratively, with us as researchers going back and forth between the transcripts, 
coded data and theoretical literature in order to further develop and refine insights (Brown 
and Lewis, 2011). 
 
Findings 
Our findings on politics, sensemaking and sensegiving are organised into the three 
hierarchical levels of top management, middle management and financial advisers in the BA 
respectively.  
Top managers 
The decision of a new knowledge vision was exclusively taken by top management, meaning 
that top management excluded the influence and participation from other, including middle 
management. Their decision processes consisted of activities such as workshops, regular 
meetings and discussions, where different perceptions, anticipations and interpretations of 
how to change the BA were openly discussed, before deciding upon a new knowledge vision. 
Two of them explain: 
We have had our differences before deciding upon a new knowledge vision and learning 
activities. I think that we now have a common interpretation of goals and of how to work, but 
it is quite complex, and those from insurance and banks have to learn to work together. 
Insurance people are used to being sellers, while bank people are resistant to being sellers. We 
need middle management to focus more on the changes and help their financial advisers 
(bank director 3). 
We had several meetings and workshops before we made the decision on a new knowledge 
vision and what activities to facilitate for, for instance learning activities. I think we had 
fruitful meetings and even though we did not always agree upon everything, I think we made 
a good decision… One thing we could have done differently was that we should have 
involved middle management in these processes; that was a mistake, I think we all see that 
now (bank director 2). 
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Top management is well aware that middle management should have been involved in the 
decision process, but still they did not involve them at a later stage. Hence, middle 
management’s perception of the change initiative and of what novelty means remains 
somewhat unclear. One of them explains: 
 We are not involved in decision processes, not even the budget process for each local bank 
that we are responsible for. We are just given ‘the order’ from the BA… We believe this is 
beyond reason… We have tried to do something about it for many years, without success… 
We only meet representatives from top management once a year for an information meeting 
(middle manager 2). 
This lack of opportunities for middle management to get involved and influence the new 
knowledge vision affected the financial advisers they are responsible for. Financial advisers 
feel the pressure to change but perceive that new knowledge only culminates in sales figures 
and budgets. Consequently, how to change their way of working and make sense of the 
novelty is overshadowed by their feelings of having less control over their own performances. 
Hence, a lack of a common understanding of how to implement the new knowledge vision 
results in some frustration. They do not really know what is expected of them and what the 
new knowledge goals are. They explain: 
We do not have any other goals than the ones the bank says that we have. These goals are just 
budget numbers. No one, not even our leader, can tell us how to work and be concrete on how 
we should prioritise our workload... We are supposed to do everything now, and be sellers. 
But we struggle with how. Several financial advisers have resigned in frustration over this 
(financial adviser 1). 
We are not involved in any decisions... we know little of the change initiative. We are just 
given ‘the orders’ from the BA… our leader tells us what the BA wants us to do. So our 
leaders are not involved either. We are the ones that have to find new ways of practice to meet 
the new goals… and we have to obtain new knowledge and perform differently as sellers, but 
how? (financial adviser 5). 
We find that top management’s exclusion of middle management in the decision process 
results in middle managers not being able to make sense of the new knowledge vision. 
Further, since top management have not facilitated sensemaking processes and activities 
among middle managers, but have focused on facilitating learning activities that first and 
foremost involved financial advisers, middle managers are left out in the dark. We find that 
top managers’ limited involvement in sensegiving that encourages middle managers’ 
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sensemaking processes can be identified as political activities. Middle management has the 
formal authority, and theoretically they are in a position to decide, or at least affect, how to 
implement the novelty in each local office. As it is now, top management has shot down 
alternative interpretations and limited middle management’s sensemaking processes through 
their (top managers’) sensegiving activities (or lack thereof). Hence, top managers’ 
exclusiveness in decision processes and in their own sensemaking processes are political 
activities. 
Among the top management group, we find different interpretations of how to implement the 
change due to differences in the experience and perceptions of how to be a sales organisation. 
As they have to make sense of the new knowledge vision, we find differences in top 
management’s sensemaking as well as contradictions about what the new knowledge vision 
means regarding changing established practices. Their ambiguous interpretation of the new 
knowledge and therefore a lack of sensemaking might serve as a trigger for their sensegiving 
activities, but this can also result in poor sensegiving. We find that they are quite enthusiastic 
about the new knowledge vision and rely on their different expertise as a possible enabler for 
their sensegiving. For instance, the fact that top managers with expertise in insurance are 
more familiar and have experience of typical sales organisations is positive for how top 
management make sense of the new knowledge vision, which again might serve as both a 
trigger and an enabler for their sensegiving activities. However, it is then problematic that 
sensemaking activities tend to stay within the top management group, as they tend to simplify 
what the new knowledge vision involves and how their employees must practice in order to 
implement the new knowledge vision. Their good intentions and motivations are explained as 
follows: 
My interpretation of our decision to be a sales organisation and that financial advisers should 
serve all four business domains is that it is a good and necessary decision. We have to change 
to match the competition and financial advisers just have to realise that. We have to secure 
their jobs (bank director 1). 
If you have knowledge about how the finance market is developing, you will also know that 
we have to earn more money and be more effective. It is important that financial advisers 
realise that. It is tough and we need our middle management and financial advisers to realise 
that. This is challenging, as they are often quite resistant to change (bank director 2). 
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Top managers’ sensemaking not being in accordance with the new knowledge of a 
knowledgeable and learning organisation has serious consequences for their sensegiving 
activities. These sensegiving activities, which force relying on one’s interpretations of new 
knowledge as only being a question of measuring sales figures, are political processes.  
  
Middle managers 
The lack of middle manager involvement in the decision processes of new knowledge and in 
how new knowledge is measured through individual sales budgets result in resistance to 
change among both middle managers and financial advisers. This exclusiveness also 
negatively affects middle managers and financial advisers’ sensegiving and sensemaking 
processes instead of creating legitimation and support for the change initiative. Those that 
meet sales budgets are quite satisfied, among both financial advisers and their middle 
managers, but still they do not recognise sales numbers as knowledge goals, or as a question 
of implementing new knowledge. Sensegiving as to how top management try to affect both 
middle managers and financial advisers’ sensemaking of the new knowledge vision is 
therefore somewhat failing, as employees feel forced, controlled and dictated to by top 
management. The result is that middle managers are not engaged in sensegiving activities 
towards their financial advisers. 
 
Middle managers’ sensemaking processes are affected by top leaders having a different 
interpretation and understanding of the new knowledge vision and its consequences for 
practical work. In addition, since middle managers are not the focus of top managers’ 
sensegiving activities, middle managers’ sensemaking processes are limited. Top managers 
not using middle managers as a strategic resource to implement new knowledge can be 
recognised as a political process. Middle managers responding by not engaging in 
sensegiving activities towards their financial advisers is also a political process. Middle 
managers have the formal position of sensegiving, but our findings show that they do not use 
these opportunities and therefore turn down alternative interpretations as well as financial 
advisers’ sensemaking processes. Two financial advisers explain: 
I do not think our leader facilitates and has his own interpretation of how we should change 
and become sellers. I do not think he has that overview of our work. It is more like 
instructions from the bank: now we should focus on this, now we should focus on that. I 
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believe our leader should take more responsibility for how we should change. We need to find 
our own way of practicing here too, so that can be frustrating even though we are used to 
working independently (financial adviser 4). 
I want my leader to be active and help me in how I must change and be a good seller. We 
have meetings, but it is very limited what we get out of them. I would prefer our leader to 
focus on how to motivate us and focus on solutions (financial adviser 10). 
 
These quotations are to some extent confirmed by middle managers, as we find that they tend 
to just refer to the BA and their decisions without making their own interpretations or 
contributions to how to implement the new knowledge vision in their local banks. Two of 
them explain: 
I just tell them, even though I know that their first reaction will be negative, that I do not have 
any other goals than those that the bank tells us to have. I am no clearer than that. I think it is 
up to them how to solve it. (middle manager) 
It is important to focus on the results. We have to change and not everything can be 
democratic all the time… But I could have been better at involving financial advisers… 
perhaps then they would feel more secure about the change and more involved in what is 
going on. (middle manager) 
 
Financial advisers’ sensemaking 
Advisers are concerned about the time pressure and about not being able to provide the 
necessary customer advice since they need to obtain a substantial amount of new knowledge 
to fulfil the new role. Moreover, they explain that they sell financial security and are afraid of 
making mistakes. For instance, within insurance and placements in stocks and funds, they 
report that mistakes can be crucial. Consequently, they find that they are moving in the wrong 
direction, as they have first been given responsibility for all four business domains, and then 
they need to obtain the necessary knowledge on all four. Several of them experience a lack of 
control. One explains: 
It has been too much since they decided that we should have all four main financial areas. 
Rather, we should specialise. Then, you could get it done properly. Now you feel more or less 
uncertain on everything. I feel that. I am afraid of not giving my customers all the information 
that is required. (financial adviser 1) 
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We should specialise. I think that we will be forced to do so because it is so demanding to 
have the necessary knowledge in all areas. I don’t think that any of us master it. The quality is 
too poor. (financial adviser 9) 
 
Middle managers’ political processes are recognised as the force of ‘ordering’ financial 
advisers to be proactive sellers. We find that financial advisers do not make sense of that role 
and that their attitudes towards salespeople are very negative. Consequently, many financial 
advisers continue to work as before, not changing how they practice, but still reaching their 
sales budgets, at least so far. This is a lack of sensemaking of the novelty and their previous 
experience and established practice and knowledge that hinders them in creating their own 
understanding of how a role as proactive sellers can be integrated into how they perform as 
financial advisers. Two of them explain: 
We are used to the word ‘seller’ being related to car sellers or vacuum cleaner sellers. We 
have to work on changing our attitudes towards our interpretation of the term. When you sell 
bank products, it is not so much a concrete product, it is more abstract. We sell security. 
(financial adviser 12) 
I don’t look at myself as a seller. Raw selling, that is just not me. I can sell a product, but is it 
the right one for the customer? I always think about the customer when I sell. I never sell a 
product that customers do not need. (financial adviser 3) 
 
We find that financial advisers are quite knowledgeable, experienced and trustworthy, which 
is confirmed by their leaders, but also their leaders find that they are quite resistant to change. 
They tend to perform in accordance with what is expected of them, but when it comes to 
being sellers and therefore more proactive towards potential customers, for instance calling 
customers at home, they find it difficult and quite a contradiction to how they are used to 
working. Therefore, they avoid these selling activities, and moreover rely on how they have 
worked with customers previously and continue with “work as usual”. Their resistance 
towards new knowledge is due to an inability to construct their own meanings of how to 
change established practice. We find that middle management are inconsistent about how to 
mobilise different tactics and learning, and for the most part they are not engaged in 
sensegiving activities. Hence, the political processes from middle managers are convergent 
and divergent actions (if any) without facilitating financial advisers’ sensemaking processes. 
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Financial advisers respond to these divergent but also forcing actions of “orders” by not 
implementing new knowledge. 
 
Discussion 
We have identified several political processes and activities related to top managers, middle 
managers and financial advisers’ sensemaking and sensegiving. In accordance with a 
practice-based approach, our focus has been on how political processes relate to how to 
change established practices through situated actions of resistance, agreement, persuasion and 
negotiation, where practitioners try to construct new meaning on how to change practice. Our 
results lead to six propositions, which are discussed next. 
 
Politics and top management’s sensegiving and sensemaking 
Maitlis and Lawrence (2007) contribute with a broad range of triggers and enablers for 
sensegiving and show patterns of how leaders (and stakeholders) affect the actions that 
produce organisational sensemaking processes. They find that leaders engage in sensegiving 
when they perceive an issue to be uncertain, ambiguous and unpredictable. That means that 
complex sensemaking results in leaders being motivated to engage in sensegiving. Complex 
sensemaking serves as a trigger for facilitation acceptance, enthusiasm and energy for change 
(Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). Our study shows the enthusiasm, motivation and energy 
mobilised among top management for the change initiative. We also find their sensemaking 
process to be ambiguous and unpredictable, where top management report on different 
interpretations and discussions internally in the group and the negotiations they have in order 
to come up with the new knowledge vision. Hence, our study confirms that complex 
sensemaking serves as a trigger and creates enthusiasm and motivation for engaging in 
sensegiving activities among top management. Top management’s sensemaking is the result 
of a flux of practicing, actions and interactions to create a new meaning and make sense of 
how to implement the new knowledge and therefore change established practices (Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick et al., 2005; Voronov, 2008). We find this sensegiving to be 
political, as sensegiving activities are initiated by top managers with a formal power position, 
using their power as a force to not only influence middle managers and employees’ 
sensemaking but also force one meaning of the truth and reality in the organisation, thereby 
turning down alternative interpretations. Moreover, we find that engaging in sensegiving 
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helps top management formulate their own sensemaking processes, especially when their 
sensemaking is characterised by perceptions of reality being unpredictable and ambiguous 
(Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). The problem is however, that their sensegiving activities for 
the most part are directed towards financial advisers. This leads us to the first proposition. 
Top managers’ exclusiveness in decision processes is a political process that has 
turned down alternative interpretations for practice and therefore affected their own 
sensemaking. 
 
Top managers are motivated by their own sensemaking as drivers for engagement in 
sensegiving activities. What we find to be crucial, however, is their lack of necessary 
knowledge and expertise on what new knowledge represents and on its consequences for 
established practice as well as how to implement it. Further, they have not involved middle 
managers or representatives from practice (financial advisers), they do not have enough 
knowledge within the top manager group and they do not have enough knowledge of relevant 
performances on what it means to be sellers and to serve the four knowledge domains for 
each financial adviser. We believe that our findings show the close link between sensemaking 
and engagement in sensegiving that Maitlis and Lawrence (2007) argue for in their studies. 
However, in our case, the lack of top leaders’ relevant expertise and the fact that the 
organisation has limited experience in how to work in accordance with new knowledge result 
in inconsistent sensegiving. This results from now having access to enough relevant 
knowledge, but also since they have not involved middle management. Top managers do not 
appreciate how inconsistency in their own words and actions, due to different interpretations 
from top managers, can undermine the facilitation of change when they do not address 
middle managers’ need for their own sensemaking, which enables them to function as change 
intermediaries (Balogun, 2003). This leads us to our second proposition. 
Top managers’ sensegiving activities are political as they do not facilitate for either the 
middle managers’ sensemaking or the financial advisers sensemaking. 
 
Politics and middle management’s sensegiving and sensemaking 
Middle managers are supposed to be change intermediaries that undertake their own personal 
change, help their staff through change, implement changes and keep the business running 
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(Balogun, 2003). This is clearly evident in our study, where top management focus on middle 
managers as change recipients with responsibilities limited to implementing new knowledge. 
There is no focus on how middle managers are to change themselves and make sense of the 
novelty, where their own sensemaking would help facilitate sensegiving activities towards 
their financial advisers. Instead, they focus on implementation and on keeping the business 
running. However, the first two roles are argued to be crucial, where the enactment of middle 
managers’ own interpretations and sensemaking is a key function (Balogun, 2003).  
 
Previous research implies contradictions between top managers’ goals and how they are 
implemented due to middle managers engaging in divergent actions for their own 
sensemaking and where top management are often negative to middle managers as they want 
to be identified with the official knowledge vision (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997). Middle 
managers’ potential lies in gathering and synthesising information from top management to 
help facilitate adaptability and use resources to champion innovative ideas from top managers 
(Floyd and Wooldridge, 1994). All these enactments must be rooted in middle managers’ 
sensemaking and interpretations, where new experiences lead to more interpretations and so 
forth (Balogun, 2003). Only through middle managers’ sensemaking, which is clearly social 
and relies on informal communication as well as formal communication, might the frustration 
of the different interpretations of top managers’ spoken intent versus their behaviour be 
hindered (Balogun, 2003). Instead, in our study, middle managers experience sensemaking 
gaps from top managers’ intent and from their sensegiving compared to what happens in 
practice. 
 
Two main explanations are vital. First, the fact that middle managers are not involved in 
decision processes shows that top managers do not appreciate middle managers’ role as 
change intermediaries and the extent to which they are able to perform this role adequately. If 
the legitimacy of middle managers’ own sensemaking is not recognised among top managers, 
and top managers do not appreciate the inconsistency in their own words and actions (their 
own sensemaking and sensegiving), middle managers fail to be responsible and might 
become paralyzed (Balogun, 2003). Second, top managers’ inconsistent sensegiving results in 
more divergent actions and sensemaking among middle managers rather than convergent 
sensemaking, as their perception of the new knowledge does not make sense and they are also 
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struggling with resistance to change among their subordinates. The middle managers in our 
study function as ‘change recipients’, being told to change but having no influence on the 
decision (Balogun and Johnson, 2004). These two points are supported by the findings in the 
literature, which argue that middle managers try to make sense of change initiatives but that 
their sensemaking and sensegiving affect whether their actions are convergent or divergent 
(Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Hope, 2010). We find that our study supports divergent action 
as well as passivity among middle managers, instead of their sensemaking processes leading 
to convergence and motivation to engage in sensegiving. Balogun (2003) argues that middle 
managers need to communicate with colleagues and peers, gather information, ask questions, 
swap experiences and exchange gossip and stories for their own interpretations and 
sensemaking. In other words, middle managers need to manage themselves through change 
while helping their departments or teams (Balogun, 2003), which provides evidence for the 
sensemaking aspects of middle managers’ role. Maitlis and Lawrence (2007) argue that 
leaders engage in sensegiving if they have the necessary knowledge and experience and/or if 
the organisation already performs well within these knowledge domains. We argue that 
middle managers do not have the formal authority or the related power position to meet the 
expectations of financial advisers to undertake personal change and help them through 
change, because the focus from top management is just on middle managers implementing 
the changes and keeping the business running. These political activities from top 
management strongly limit middle managers’ engagement in sensemaking and sensegiving. 
This finding is opposed to that of Hope (2010), who finds that middle managers that mobilise 
resource power (such as expertise in the business) strongly influence the sensemaking of 
others through sensegiving activities, including superiors’ sensemaking. This leads to the 
third and fourth propositions. 
Middle managers do not engage in top managers sensegiving activities on how to implement 
new practices. This is recognized as a political process among middle managers which affects 
their sensemaking.  
Middle managers not engaging in sensegiving is a political process that affects financial 
advisers’ sensemaking processes.  
 
Politics and financial advisers’ sensemaking 
Sensegiving is enabled by the combination of a discursive ability to allow employees to 
construct and articulate persuasive accounts for the world and process facilitators in the form 
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of organisational routines, practices and performances (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). What is 
clearly stated through our study is that sensegiving is a result of sensemaking processes, both 
at a top management level and among middle managers. At both these levels, leaders have 
the formal authority and power, while financial advisers might feel empowered by the 
redefinitions of how to change practice. At the same time, financial advisers need to engage 
in sensemaking on how to change practice. Instead, they experience inconsistent sensegiving 
and sensemaking activities among top and middle management. These challenges are 
supported by a number of authors who argue that resistance to change is due to threats to 
established practice and because existing power positions need renegotiation (Carlie, 2002; 
Hardy et al., 2003; Lawrence et al., 2005; Newell et al., 2009; Mørk et al., 2010). When we 
approach resistance to change, we find that political activities hinder the legitimacy and 
support for change. This is in line with change and innovation relying on a combination of 
the exploitation and exploration of knowledge as stated by March (1991), where employees, 
or in our case financial advisers, must create meaning on how to both combine and change 
their role accordingly. Instead, sensemaking in our study, among middle managers and 
financial advisers, is largely reduced to employees reacting or adapting to what is handed to 
them, instead of sensemaking as constructing and finding actual meaning that makes sense in 
relation to established practice (Weick et al., 2005). This leads to our fifth proposition: 
Top and middle managers’ sensemaking as a contradiction between the new knowledge vision 
and how they want established practice to change is a political process that affects financial 
advisers’ sensemaking. 
 
We have argued that middle managers’ own sensemaking is crucial and strongly affects their 
social interaction and formal and informal communication with financial advisers to help 
them change (Balogun, 2003). Owing to different interpretations perceived in top 
management’s sensegiving, including spoken intent and their behaviours, middle managers 
fail to be responsible for both their own and financial advisers’ sensemaking; as a result, 
financial advisers experience middle managers as just following orders from top managers 
that do not make sense of how to change established practice. If middle managers were given 
responsibility and acknowledgement for their role of planning, budgeting resources and 
having to oversee change-related activities, their sensemaking would help them interpret 
financial advisers’ experiences, what this means for practice and the implications for how 
they should change. Instead, both middle managers and financial advisers perceive a 
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contradiction between what top management have decided upon as a new knowledge vision 
and top management’s limited focus on measurements and sales budgets. This hinders their 
meaning construction and reconstruction as they attempt to develop a meaningful framework 
for understanding the new knowledge, which are the basics of sensemaking (Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991). For middle managers, the result is less communication with financial 
advisers. This is problematic, as most sense is made through the social processes of 
sensemaking at the recipient level (Hope, 2010). In these social processes, middle managers 
should interact by exchanging stories, rumours, jokes, conversations and discussions to form 
an interpretation of what to do to put the change into action (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; 
Maitlis, 2005). Instead, we find that financial advisers are afraid of the consequences of 
changing their ways of working when it comes to customer care and having enough 
knowledge of financial products to give satisfactory advice. We also find that middle 
managers experience more or less the same and therefore they do not engage in sensegiving 
activities towards financial advisers, and when they do their actions are perceived as 
convergent and divergent. Hence, for the most part, they are unable to help financial advisers’ 
sensemaking of the change initiative. This leads to the sixth proposition: 
Top managers’ sensegiving and middle managers not engaging in sensegiving are both 
political processes that affect financial advisers’ sensemaking with the consequences of 
financial advisers not implementing new knowledge. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we identified six propositions of how political processes and activities influence 
the sensemaking and sensegiving of new knowledge among top managers, middle managers 
and financial advisers in a Norwegian bank. Top managers’ political activities of excluding 
others from the decision process and relying on their own expertise prevented them from 
grasping the complexity of a new knowledge vision in their own sensemaking processes and 
resulted in sensegiving that was characterised by contradictions between their interpretations 
and spoken intent versus their facilitation of how to change practice. Middle managers’ 
sensemaking of their new role were affected by the politics of top managers. They were not 
given the authority as change intermediaries, which would enable their personal change and 
help their staff through the change. Instead, they were just told to focus on implementing 
change and keeping the business running. Middle managers’ political activities were to 
accept top managers’ sensegiving instead of managing themselves in their own sensemaking 
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to help financial advisers with how to change their role and practice. As a result, middle 
managers’ sensemaking affects their engagement in sensegiving. They moreover force down 
an acceptance of financial advisers having to work as sellers serving all four business 
domains, which limits the goal of a new knowledge vision. Hence, the political activities of 
top management affect middle managers’ sensemaking and sensegiving. For financial 
advisers, the political processes of top and middle managers result in resistance, as they 
struggle with sensemaking in terms of their perception on how to change and implement the 
new knowledge vision. 
 
Our study showed how sensemaking processes affect leaders’ facilitation of sensegiving, 
where top managers settle for plausibility when dealing with ambiguity in their own 
sensemaking and where middle managers follow orders and turn down alternative 
interpretations in their own sensemaking. Hence, top leaders and middle managers’ 
sensegiving results in financial advisers’ sensemaking being closer to the exploitation of 
established practice than it is to an exploration of how to change practice. These findings 
outline the close link between sensemaking and facilitation through sensegiving activities and 
highlight the importance of acknowledging middle managers as strategic assets and change 
intermediaries. Instead, financial advisers engage in their own interpretations of the novelty 
among other financial advisers with the results of not implementing the new knowledge 
vision in accordance with top managers’ intent. 
 
Implications for practice 
Our findings highlight the importance of top management’s role and demonstrate that they 
need to involve all levels in their own sensemaking of strategic decisions and in how to 
facilitate through sensegiving activities. By acknowledging middle managers as strategic 
assets and change intermediaries, middle managers’ own sensemaking is in focus as is how 
they are to change their role in accordance with the new knowledge and their role as 
facilitators and sensegivers. Leaders and managers need to engage in formal and informal 
communication with colleagues and peers, gather information, ask questions, swap 
experiences, exchange stories and engage in interpretations, perceptions and expectations of 
how to change practice in order to develop their own sensemaking and help employees at all 
levels in their sensemaking processes (how to change and implement new knowledge). 
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Further, changing established practice as a result of the exploration and exploitation of 
knowledge takes time and needs to be made sense of before it is implemented at all levels of 
the organisation. The focus on sensemaking is most important, as this creates the starting 
point for relevant sensegiving activities. Sensemaking processes will therefore enable leaders 
in sensegiving activities that need to be consistent to determine expectations and a common 
interpretation of spoken intent on new knowledge in accordance with behaviour at all levels.  
 
Limitations of the study 
Our study has several limitations. The first limitation, studying one specific change process 
does not necessarily capture other aspects of social dynamics such as individual and 
organizational aspects that would influence implementation of new knowledge. Second, only 
branches of one bank alliance in one country call for our findings to be investigated in other 
professions and geographical contexts. The third limitation is to be found in the data 
collection method. We relied on semi-structured interviews, observations of meetings and 
informal conversations. Our findings might also been strengthened by adding more data 
sources (e.g. emails, diaries or more observations of daily practices).  
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